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COMMENTS 
CIVIL RIGHTS-LEGISLATION-THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1957 
-The enactment by Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 
indicates movement in an area which has long remained dormant. 
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It is the purpose of this comment to note the nature of the prior 
legislation in the civil rights area, the provisions of the new act 
and the effect of the new act upon civil rights protection. 
I. Prior Legislation 
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 ended an eighty-
two year period marked by the absence of federal civil rights 
legislation. The former legislation consisted of five acts passed 
in the nine-year period between 1866 and 1875. These acts, passed 
by the post-Civil War Reconstruction Congress, were intended to 
secure a status of equality to the Negro whose freedom from 
slavery was secured by the Thirteenth Amendment.1 Measured 
by the standard of achievement of this objective, however, they 
were a dismal failure.2 
Shortly after the Civil War ended, the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment emancipated the Negro and abolished 
slavery forever from the United States3 The southern states soon 
discovered that what could no longer be done by means of institu-
tionalized slavery could still be substantially accomplished by 
means of restrictive state legislation.4 It was to combat such so-
called "Black Codes" that the first civil rights act was passed in 
1866.5 In it Congress provided that all citizens, without regard 
to color, were entitled to the same rights to contract, sue, give 
evidence, take, hold and convey property, and to the equal bene-
fit of all laws for the security of person and property.6 The doubts 
raised as to the constitutionality of this act impelled Congress to 
propose the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.7 Within a 
1 See CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947); Gressman, "The Unhappy 
History of Civil Rights Legislation,'' 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952). 
2 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM!IUTTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (To SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS) (1947); CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 41 (1947). 
3 This amendment was adopted by Congress February 1, 1865, and ratified on De-
cember 18, 1865. 
4 See Maslow and Robison, "Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for ~quality 
1862-1952,'' 20 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 363 at 366, 367 (1953). 
5 See Fraenkel, "The Federal Civil Rights Laws," 31 MINN. L. R.Ev. 301 at 304 (1947); 
Maslow and Robison, "Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality 1862-1952," 
20 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 363 at 367 (1953). 
614 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S .. C. (1952) §1982, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §242. 
7 The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted June 16, 1866, and ratified July 21, 1868. 
The Fifteenth Amendment was adopted February 26, 1869, and ratified March 30, 1870. 
See Clark, "A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes,'' 47 CoL. L. R.Ev. 
175 at 177 (1947); Biddle, "Civil Rights and the Federal Law,'' SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBER-
TIES TODAY 109 at 122 (1945). 
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year after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment by the states, 
two more civil rights acts were written into law: those of May 
31, 1870, and February 28, 1871. The former reenacted the 1866 
act to place it under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and endeavored to effectuate the right of free suffrage without 
discrimination as to race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude. 8 The latter of the two acts supplemented the former and 
gave further effect to its voting provisions by providing for the 
supervision of elections by officials to be appointed thereunder.9 
Once again, however, Congress discovered its intent being 
frustrated; this time by the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and 
similar organizations which had arisen.1° Congress's response to 
the situation was the enactment of the fourth civil rights act on 
April 20, 1871, aimed at regulating these groups by imposing 
penalties for depriving any person of the equal protection of the 
law, or equal privileges and immunities under the law by con-
spiracy or under color of law.11 The culmination of the legisla-
tive program came on March 1, 1875, with the adoption of the 
fifth and last of the civil rights acts which required all inns, 
public conveyances and other places of public amusement to 
accommodate all persons, subject only to such conditions as 
were applicable to citizens of every race and color.12 
Thus, Congress had evolved a broad plan for the protection 
by the federal government of the rights of the recently emanci-
pated slaves. However, the basic question which had to be an-
swered before the civil rights acts could effectuate their purpose 
was whether, pursuant to the constitutional amendments as draft-
ed and judicially interpreted, the federal government had the 
authority to protect the kinds of rights enumerated in the acts 
and against whom the government could enforce such rights. 
In a series of decisions between 1873 and 1909 the Supreme 
Court answered that question in a manner which in the end 
fatally impaired the effectiveness of Congress's plan. A death blow 
was dealt the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the holding of the Court in the Slaughterhouse 
816 Stat. 140 (1870), 18 U.S.C. (1952) §241, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1988. 
916 Stat. 433 (1871). 
10 See Clark, "A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes," 47 CoL. L. 
REv. 175 at 177 (1947); Maslow and Robison, "Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight 
for Equality 1862-1952," 20 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 363 at 369 (1953). 
ll 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1983, 1985. 
12 18 Stat. 336 (1875). 
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Gases13 that only rights of national citizenship received protection 
from the privileges and immunities clause and such national 
citizenship did not comprehend any of the fundamental rights 
of the individual.14 Three years later, in United States v. Gruik-
shank,15 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment rights 
were restrictions only upon the states and not on private individ-
uals and that the power of Congress to enforce its provisions 
was accordingly limited.16 Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment had fallen beneath the onslaught of strict construction. As 
early as the Slaughterhouse Gases, 17 the Court had refused to ex-
tend the concept of slavery and involuntary servitude beyond the 
bounds of forced labor so as to include the subjection of one to 
a badge of servitude by discrimination. Moreover, as might well 
be expected in an atmosphere of strict construction, defects were 
discovere_d in the drafting of the civil rights acts.18 
Thus, the pattern of strict construction had been set. Even 
though relatively few sections of the acts had been specifically de-
clared unconstitutional,19 the majority of the sections had been 
based originally upon a much broader interpretation of congres-
sional authority. Recognition was extended only to those pro-
VISions dealing with rights protected against state action 
and with rights which could be guaranteed against individ-
13 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873). 
14 See Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," 50 -MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1323 at 1333 (1952). The Court indicated that such rights of national citizenship 
included the rights to travel to the national capitol, to sue in federal courts, and to be 
protected while abroad or on the high seas. 
15 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
16 This elimination of redress against private action served to strike down many of 
the other provisions of the acts. It was on this basis that the Court in United States v. 
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), declared void the conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871. In a similar fashion, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
declared unconstitutional the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 
17 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), in which the Court held that 
since •the terms of the act of 1870 attempted to enforce voting rights at both state and 
federal elections, the failure to limit interference to cases based solely on race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude rendered the act without the scope of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and consequently, unconstitutional. Accord: Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 
678 (1887); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). 
19 Four sections were completely eradicated •by decisions holding them unconstitu• 
tional: §§3 and 4 of the act of 'May 31, 1870, by United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); 
§§1 and 2 of the act of March 1, 1875, by the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
Section 5 of the act of May 31, 1870, which had been held unconstitutional by James 
v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903), was subsequently repealed by 35 Stat. 1153 (1909). Two 
other sections were revised to enable them to withstand a constitutional attack: §2 of the 
act of April 20, 1871, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1985, and §16 of the act of May 31, 1870, 42 
u.s.c. (1952) §1981. 
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ual action because they were created by the Constitution or 
federal laws.2° Furthermore, it was not only the decisions of the 
Court which inhibited the effectiveness of the acts. The adminis-
trative difficulty of getting local prosecutors to prosecute, judges 
to adjudicate impartially and jurors to convict,21 and the action 
of Congress in revising and repealing earlier legislation22 aided 
in frustrating the plan for the protection of rights established by 
the three constitutional amendments and the five original acts. 
II. Surviving Prior Legislation 
The legislation which survived and serves to give present 
protection of civil rights, exclusive of the Act of 1957, can be 
placed into four basic categories: (1) those sections which merely 
declare rights but carry no remedial sanctions, (2) those which cre-
ate remedies in the form of civil causes of action, (3) those which 
impose criminal sanctions, and (4) those which are procedural 
and implement the effectiveness of the other sanctions. 
Included in the first category would be sections 1971, 1981, 
and 1982 of title 42, United States Code (1952).23 These three 
sections merely declare the existence of equality without distinc-
tion as to race, color, or previous condition of servitude in such 
matters as voting, owning property, ability to sue, give evidence, 
contract, and the like. 
Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 of title 42, United States Code 
(1952), are placed in the second category. Section 1983 provides 
a civil remedy for the deprivation of rights by persons acting 
under color of law while section 1985 gives similar causes of 
action for conspiracy to interfere with or deprive a person of 
his federal rights. Similarly, section 1986 allows a civil recovery 
against those who, having the power to prevent the commission 
of such acts, refuse or neglect to do so. 
The third category is composed of sections 241, 242, 243, and 
594 of title 18, United States Code (1952). Section 241 makes a 
conspiracy to injure a citizen in the exercise of his federally se-
20 Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," 50 MICH. L. REv. 
1323 at 1342 (1952). 
21 CUMMINGS AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 230 (1937). 
22 In 1873 when all federal laws were recodified and published as the Revised 
Statutes, the civil rights acts were separated under unrelated chapters. In 1894, most of 
the provisions protecting suffrage were repealed by 28 Stat. 36, and in 1909, when the 
federal criminal laws were recodified, more provisions were eliminated by 35 Stat. 1092. 
2314 Stat. 546 (1867), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1994, declares peonage to be abolished in 
the United States and might be included in this category. 
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cured rights a felony, and section 242 states that willful action, 
under color of law, to deprive an inhabitant of his federally se-
cured or protected rights is a misdemeanor. Section 243 for-
bids disqualification for jury service because of race or color and 
renders such action by officers charged with selecting jurors a 
crime punishable by a fine. Section 594 imposes a fine upon per-
sons who interfere with the right to vote in elections at which 
federal officials are chosen. 
The last category includes sections 1343 and 1443 of title 28, 
United States Code (1952). The former section vests jurisdiction 
in the district courts over civil actions commenced by a person 
for the redress of any right given him under the Constitution or 
act of Congress, and the latter section allows removal of state 
proceedings to the federal district court by the defendant on the 
ground that he is being deprived of his equal civil rights as a 
citizen of the United States.24 
Out of the foregoing provisions, it would appear that only 
three sections assume any great importance insofar as active en-
forcement is concerned, i.e., sections 241 and 242 of title 18, 
United States Code (1952), and 1983 of title 42, United States Code 
(1952).25 Of these three sections, only section 241 extends to the 
actions of individuals and, even then, only when they are acting 
in conspiracy. The scope of its protection includes only the rights 
"secured by the Constitution and federal laws." It is clear that 
this would include those rights created directly by the Constitu-
tion or Congress in the exercise of its substantive powers.26 On 
the other hand, it is still doubtful whether the federally protected 
rights guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process and equal protection clauses are incorporated 
into this section, even though the individuals involved had been 
acting under color of law. This issue was presented in United 
States v. Williams,21 where the defendants, acting under color of 
law, had obtained confessions by the use of force an~ were in-
dicted under section 241 for having interfered with a right aris-
24 18 Stat. 337 (1875), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1984, also provides for appeal to the Supreme 
Court and, hence, could be included within this category. 
25 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1985(3), was rendered practicall}' useless by 
the Court's decision in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 
26 E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (right to vote in and have one's 
vote counted in a federal election); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (right 
to freedom from mob violence while in the custody of a federal officer); United States 
v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (right to establish a claim under the Homestead Act). 
21 341 U.S. 70 (1951). See Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legisla-
tion," 50 M1cH. L. REv. 1323 at 1348 (1952). 
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ing from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court split four to four on the issue and, thus, did not deter-
mine whether the rights mentioned in section 241 included those 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the ulti-
mate scope of section 241 protection remains to be determined by 
future Court decisions. Both of the remaining sections, sections 
242 and 1983, involve action under color of law where either 
federally secured or protected rights are involved. It would seem 
clear that the rights given under the due process, equal protec-
tion, and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as those rights given by national citizenship 
and federal laws can be protected under both of these sections.28 
The effectiveness of the protection under section 242 is limited 
by the requirement that the action be willful.29 
Hence, at the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957, the broad plan for the protection of rights envisioned 
and pronounced by the Reconstruction Congress had been nar-
rowed to these few provisions. 
III. The Civil Rights Act of 195730 
In essence the act consists of four main provisions: (1) the 
creation of a Civil Rights Commission, 31 (2) the addition of an 
assistant attorney general,32 (3) the further protection of voting 
rights,33 and (4) the elimination of the requirement that federal 
jurors be competent as such under the state law.34 
One of the important problems confronting the Congress at 
the present time is the need for an intensive study in the field 
of civil rights to determine what, if any, steps need to be taken 
in the enactment of future legislation.35 Consequently, the act 
provides for the appointment by the President of a six-man bi-
partisan Civil Rights Commission36 which is to have two main 
28 Section 242 was applied in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), to voting 
in a primary election which involved the selection of federal officials; and in Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), to the alleged brutality of state police officers. 
29 It was by a strict interpretation of the requirement of willful action that the 
Supreme Court warded off an attack on §242 because of vagueness in Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
30 71 Stat. 634 (1957). 
31 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §§1975 to 1975e. 
32 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 5 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §295-1. 
33 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1971. 
34 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1861, 
35 H. Rep. 291 on H.R. 6127, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957). 
36 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1975. 
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objectives: (1) to investigate allegations that citizens are being 
deprived of their right to vote by reason of their race, color, re-
ligion or national origin, and (2) to study the development of 
the laws and policies of the federal government with respect to 
insuring equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.37 To accomplish such objectives, the commission is 
authorized to conduct hearings whenever and wherever it deems 
such to be necessary38 and has the power by subpoena to compel 
the attendance of witnesses from anywhere in the state in which 
such hearings are being held.39 Its activities will culminate in a 
final report and recommendation to the President and Congress 
within two years from the date of enactment.40 Sixty days there-
after the commission will cease to function.41 
Closely associated with a desire for information regarding 
future legislation is the recognition of a need for the immediate 
strengthening of the enforcement of existing rights.42 For that 
reason; the act provides for the appointment by the President of 
an additional assistant attorney general in the Department of 
Justice.43 Although the act does not so provide, it is understood 
that there will be created in the Department of Justice a new Civil 
Rights Division to replace the present Civil Rights Section of the 
Criminal Division.44 
In order further to secure and protect the citizens' right to 
vote and prohibit the unjust infringement thereof, the act de-
clares it to be unlawful for an individual, whether acting under 
color of law or otherwise, to interfere with the right to vote in 
any general, special, or primary election concerning federal of-
ficers. 45 Congress realized that such a declaration would be in-
effective without a remedy for such interference, and, hence, has 
conferred upon the Attorney General the authority to institute 
a civil action to prevent an act which would deprive a person of 
such rights.46 This includes the use of injunctive relief. Moreover, 
87 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1975(c). 
8871 Stat. 636 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §l975(d). 
89 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §§1975(a) and (d). 
40 71 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1975c(b). 
4171 Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1975c(c). 
42 H. Rep. 291 on H.R. 6127, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957); H. Hearings Before 
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 569 (1957). 
43 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 5 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §295-1. 
44 H. Rep. 291 on H,R. 6127, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1957). 
45 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1971(b). 
46 71 ~tat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1971(c). 
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the act protects the right to vote for state and local officials by 
extending the injunctive remedy to that portion of section 1971 
of title 42, United States Code, which was already in existence. 
To prevent frustration of such remedial action by administrative 
processes, it is clearly stated that the district courts are to have 
jurisdiction over action brought thereunder without regard to 
whether any administrative remedies have been provided or 
pursued.47 Nevertheless, some of the effectiveness of the civil 
remedy given to the Attorney General has been circumscribed 
by the inclusion in the act of the so-called "jury trial amendment." 
Cases of criminal contempt48 arising under the act are subject 
to a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine 
of $1,000. In the first instance, the district court may determine 
whether or not trial shall be before a jury; however, if the trial is 
held without a jury and the penalty inflicted exceeds an im-
prisonment of more than forty-five days or a fine of $300, the 
accused, upon demand, may have a trial de novo before a jury.49 
Finally, the act amended the Judicial Code, section 1861 of 
title 28, United States Code (1952) to eliminate the requirement 
that federal jurors be competent as petit or grand jurors under 
the law of the state in which the district is located. Thus, the 
standard for federal jury service has become uniform. However, 
one requirement, i.e., one year's residence within the judicial 
district, has been added to that section.50 
IV. Effect of the Present Act 
Insofar as the further protection of civil rights is concerned, 
the present act has accomplished essentially three substantive 
changes in existing law: (I) extending effective protection 
against interference with the right to vote to include action by 
individuals alone as well as those acting in conspiracy or under 
color of law, (2) providing a more flexible remedy to the At-
47 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §197l(d). 
48 This provision does not apply to contempts committed in the presence of thel 
court or so near thereto as to interfere with the administration of justice, or to the 
misbehavior of any officer of the court in respect to the writs, orders, or process of the 
court. Likewise, it does not affect the power of the court to secure compliance with its 
orders by the usual type of civil contempt proceedings. 
49 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1995. 
50 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1861. The effect of section 122 of the 
new act which repeals section 1989 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. (1952) §1993] which 
gave to the President authority to use armed forces will not be discussed since it has 
been treated in 56 MICH. L. REv. 249 at 261, 262 (1957). 
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torney General by permitting suits for injunction upon threat-
ened interference with voting rights, and (3) eliminating the 
requirement that federal jurors be competent under state law. 
Prior to the new act, the statute51 giving to all citizens the 
right to vote in all elections without discrimination based on 
race or color had been subject to two major defects: failure to pro-
tect voters from unlawful interference by private individuals and 
failure to lodge any authority in the federal government to obtain 
preventive relief by the use of civil remedies.52 The new act has 
corrected both of these defects by prohibiting any person whether 
acting under color of law or otherwise from interfering with the 
right to vote for federal officials, 53 and providing the Attorney Gen-
eral with the authority to bring a civil action for or in the name of 
the United States for a threatened interference with such right. 
With respect to the prohibition upon individuals acting 
privately, insofar as federal elections are concerned, it has become 
clear that the right of qualified voters in a state to cast their 
ballots and have them counted is within the right secured by the 
Constitution to choose federal officers.54 Since the constitutional 
command is not restricted or limited, the right, unlike those 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is se-
cured against the action of individuals as well as states.55 Hence, 
the present act is within the bounds of constitutional authority 
in governing the actions of individuals acting privately in inter-
fering with federal elections. The injunctive remedy may also 
be utilized in state and local elections since it is made applicable 
to the previously existing provisions of section 1971. In this 
instance, however, it would appear to be applicable only to those 
individuals acting under color of law since the constitutional 
authority of the federal government to regulate state elections 
is given only by the Fifteenth Amendment. The only means of 
encompassing private individual action at state elections would 
be by extending the present concepts of state action to include 
an obligation on the states to guarantee free access to state elec-
tions. 
The ability of the Attorney General to bring a separate civil 
51 16 Stat. 140 (1870), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1971. 
52 H. Rep. 291 on H.R: 6127, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 11 (1957); H. Hearings Before 
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 570 (1957). 
53 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1971. 
54 U.S. CONST., art. I, §§2, 4. 
55 Ex parte Yarbrough, IIO U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 
(1951). 
1958] COMMENTS 629 
action for injunctive relief should result in a substantial exten-
sion of protection. As has been noted previously in the discussion, 
until the advent of the new act, the only sanctions which were 
authorized for use by the federal government itself were the crim-
inal remedies in sections 241 and 242 of title 18, United States 
Code (1952). Because criminal prosecutions cannot be instituted 
until the harm has been done, they are effective as a deterrent only 
insofar as the threat of successful imposition of punishment can 
serve as an inhibiting influence.56 The only civil remedies avail-
able to the government were those obtained by intervention to 
secure contempt citations against those who interfered with in-
junctions obtained by private persons from the federal courts 
under section 1983 of title 42, United States Code (1952). Under 
the new act, it is not necessary that a private person initially 
institute civil proceedings before the government can take action. 
The greatest source of interpretative difficulty with the act 
would appear to be with regard to the contempt provisions. The 
jury trial option is made applicable only to an indirect criminal57 
contempt, and, hence, the somewhat nebulous distinctions be-
tween civil and criminal contempt assume major importance. 
Congress has endeavored to alleviate the problem by stating 
the usual distinction between civil and criminal contempt, i.e., 
civil proceedings are designed to secure compliance with or pre-
vent obstruction of, as distinguished from punishment for viola-
tions of, any court order.58 This, however, does not alleviate the 
difficult problems of applying the distinction to given factual 
situations. 
The removal of the requirement that federal jurors be com-
petent as grand or petit jurors under the qualifications set up 
by the states should prohibit any attempt by the states to bar any 
particular minority group from federal jury service. 
Perhaps the element of the new act which assumes the great-
est importance is the indication which it gives of the increased 
interest in and recognition of the need for protection of civil 
rights on the national level by the federal government and the 
fact that civil rights legislation can survive a journey through 
both houses of Congress, withstanding even the weapon of filibust-
er. In addition, the act makes substantial strides outside the sphere 
56 H. Hearings, note 52 supra, p. 590. 
57 See note 48 supra. 
fiS 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957) §1995. 
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of effective remedial protection of civil rights. The activities of 
the Civil Rights Commission in both studying the laws and 
policies in regard to civil rights protection and investigating 
specific allegations of deprivation of voting rights may lead to 
a better understanding of the nature and scope of the problem 
which will, in turn, indicate the path to its alleviation. Like-
wise, the increased emphasis which undoubtedly will be placed 
upon enforcement by the new Civil Rights Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice will aid in making more effective use of the reme-
dies which are available to the government. Moreover, the pro-
vision for the appointment of an assistant attorney general to lead 
such division will permit responsibility for the complex problems 
of the civil rights field, involving delicate problems of the federal-
state relationship, to be centered in a person with the status of a 
presidential appointee who will be able to devote full time and 
attention to the legal aspects of civil rights problems within the 
area of federal jurisdiction. 
It is, of course, difficult and perhaps premature to attempt 
to determine or define the exact impact of the act upon federal 
protection of civil rights. Nevertheless, it is a step forward, and 
after eighty-two years, any step in this direction is a substantial 
accomplishment. 
Thomas R. Winquist, S.Ed. 
